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Fiddling with Federal Circuit Precedent: 
The Commercial and Qualitative Impact 
of Recent Supreme Court Reversals on 
the U.S. Patent System 
Christopher J. Hamersky* 
Prior to 2006, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit  
enjoyed a fairly laissez-faire relation with the Supreme Court of 
the United States, enabling it to develop a patent law jurispru-
dence that patent practitioners could confidently rely on given that 
it had remained relatively stable for several decades. However, in 
2006, the Supreme Court reviewed eBay v. MercExchange and 
subsequently began a string of frequent Federal Circuit reversals 
that have caused significant change to the U.S. patent system. 
Whereas the Supreme Court rarely took up patent appeals in the 
Federal Circuit’s early history, it now routinely reviews patent 
questions each term and often reverses Federal Circuit precedent 
to fundamentally change the patent law jurisprudence. 
This Note endeavors to review several of the most impactful  
decisions from the last two decades of patent law jurisprudence in 
order to showcase the extent to which prior patent norms were  
upended. In juxtaposing these highlighted, fundamental changes in 
U.S. patent jurisprudence against the different protections and  
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litigation procedures offered in jurisdictions abroad, this Note 
stresses the importance of immediate congressional action to  
rectify an apparent decline in the U.S. patent system and notes 
what concerns to specifically address in order to repair the system 
as a whole. 
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INTRODUCTION 
To say the U.S. patent system has been experiencing some  
turbulence in the past decade or so would be putting it mildly. 
Since around 1996, the patent system has experienced increasing 
numbers of both substantive and procedural shifts1 that have cate-
gorically changed the way patent practitioners and commercial  
entities operate.2 These changes have come from both legislative 
action3 and judicial decisions,4 though it is the latter that is seem-
ingly causing more uncertainty and thus arguably “weakening” the 
viability of the patent system from a global perspective.5 In par-
ticular, it is the frequent reversal of Federal Circuit precedent by 
the Supreme Court that most routinely causes upheavals in the  
patent system as practitioners know it.6 
This idea, that the Supreme Court has recently upended patent 
law, is in no way new. At this point, seemingly all patent prac-
titioners have at some point vocalized their concerns in some  
capacity as to the significance of these changes and argued over 
whether the change was warranted.7 This is in part because the  
 
1 See generally Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996) 
(holding that the terms comprising patent claims are to be determined by a judge, not a 
jury). Consequently, a Markman hearing has become a keystone piece to any patent 
litigation, thus fundamentally changing the norm of patent disputes in the United States. 
See 
J. Michael Jakes, Using an Expert at a Markman Hearing: Practical and Tactical 
Considerations, FINNEGAN (Aug. 2002), https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/using-an-
expert-at-a-markman-hearing-practical-and-tactical.html [https://perma.cc/9ZM8-AGZJ] 
(noting how Markman effectively “added ‘Markman’ to [the patent community’s] 
professional vocabulary and created a new proceeding . . . in patent litigation”). 
2 This is not to imply that there were no substantive or procedural changes in patent 
law prior to 1996, only that there was a sharp increase in the frequency of significant 
changes following Markman. See infra Sections I, II.a–i. 
3 See generally Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 
(2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.) (changing the U.S. patent 
system from a first-to-invent to a first-to-file system, altering post-grant opposition 
actions, and tweaking the timelines on which inventors and their attorneys operate) 
[hereinafter AIA]. 
4 See infra Sections I, II.a–i. 
5 See infra Sections I, II.a–i. 
6 See infra Sections I, II.a–i. 
7 See generally Darren Smyth, The IP Kat in Despair—What Is to Be Done When 
Senior Courts Don’t Understand Novelty?, IP KAT (May 9, 2013), https://ipkitten.blog
spot.com/2013/05/the-ipkat-in-despair-what-is-to-be-done.html [https://perma.cc/5NFF-
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Supreme Court very seldom granted certiorari to appeals from the 
Federal Circuit during the lower court’s early history.8 According-
ly, the increased scrutiny has fallen squarely on ascertaining the 
rationale behind the Supreme Court’s turbulent patent decisions 
since 2006.9 Said rationale, of course, has proven elusive and thus 
led to conjecture. 
One of the more common reasons speculated is that the Su-
preme Court Justices just do not understand the subject material 
coming before them on patent appeals, even if said appeals contain 
mountains of expert testimony and scientific aids to the layman in  
grasping the technical details behind a dispute.10 Consequently, the 
speculated unfamiliarity with the inventive matters at hand suppos-
edly hinders decision-making because the Justices are seemingly  
either unable to appreciate the extent to which the parties have  
invested in the subject material or are unable to sufficiently fore-
cast what ripple effects a contemplated change in patent law would 
have.11 Although proponents of this reasoning assert that there is 
clear evidence to support this rationale as the reason behind the  
recent string of patent decisions from the Supreme Court,12 there is 
arguably a more subtle, on-point explanation for the recent series 
of patent law reversals over the last decade or so: a perceived lack 
of uniformity and an interest in bringing patent law more in line 
with the Court’s general jurisprudence. 
 
JAAG]; Emma Barraclough, US Supreme Court Rewrites Rules on Patent Exhaustion, 
WIPO (Aug. 2017), https://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2017/04/article_0008.html 
[https:// 
perma.cc/2KNK-M4J8]; Gene Quinn, Did the Supreme Court Intentionally Destroy the 
U.S. Patent System?, IP WATCHDOG (May 22, 2018), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/
05/22/did-the-supreme-court-intentionally-destroy-the-u-s-patent-system/id=97514/ 
[https://perma.cc/F52C-NBDH]. 
8 See infra Section I.b. 
9 See infra Section I.b. 
10 See Quinn, supra note 7; David Kline, Is the Supreme Court Killing Life Science 
Innovation?, MICHELSON INST. FOR INTELL. PROP. (Apr. 24, 2017)), https://michelson
ip.com/supreme-court-killing-life-science-innovation [https://perma.cc/2YES-UYEC]; 
see also Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 596 
(2013) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
11 See Quinn, supra note 7; Kline, supra note 10. 
12 See Quinn, supra note 7 (“Indeed, we have proof of the folly associated with 
thinking that the Supreme Court is sufficiently competent to address issues of patent law 
and technology that are at the heart of American competitiveness.”). 
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The Federal Circuit was created in 1982 in part to streamline 
patent law disputes given such disputes’ focus on science and in-
ventive matters, something the other courts of appeals did not nec-
essarily handle routinely. 13  The Supreme Court has openly 
acknowledged this specialization, even asking litigants at oral ar-
guments why the high court should not defer to the specialized 
court to some degree on patent matters.14 However, the Supreme 
Court has also not been above expressing a modicum of reproach 
should they find the lower court’s jurisprudence to be lacking with 
regard to consistency.15 Such expressions never quite rise to the 
level of contempt, but there are several express instances of re-
proach that would indicate that the Justices are willing to move 
forward on patent matters with less deference to the Federal Cir-
cuit.16 Consequently, they have since begun granting certiorari to 
more patent disputes than before and in turn are creating waves for 
both patent practitioners and the commercial entities heavily inter-
ested in a stable patent system.17 
Given the perceived lack of uniformity within the Federal  
Circuit and continued lack of additional congressional intent with 
regard to the patent system,18 the Supreme Court now evidently  
 
13 See Rodney F. Page & Ellen E. Sward, The Federal Courts Improvement Act:  
A Practitioner’s Perspective, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 385, 387 (1984) (“The Federal Circuit, 
for example, is a compromise between specialization, which can produce uniformity, and 
generalization, which can prevent stagnation.”); see also Federal Court Improvement Act, 
Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982). 
14 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 9:1–9:5, Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & 
Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545 (2014) (No. 12-1184) (Chief Justice Roberts asking litigants, 
“why shouldn’t [the Supreme Court] give some deference to the decision of the court that 
was set up to develop patent law in a uniform way? They have a much better idea than 
[the Supreme Court] do[es] about the consequences of these fee awards in particular 
cases.”). 
15 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 26:5–26:11, Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health 
Mgmt. Sys., 572 U.S. 559 (2014) (No. 12-1163) (Chief Justice Roberts stating that “the 
Federal Circuit was established to bring about uniformity in patent law, but they seem to 
have a great deal of disagreement among themselves and are going back and forth in 
particular cases, in this area specifically, about what the appropriate approach is”). 
16 See id.; see also Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 572 U.S. 915, 921 
(2014) (Justice Alito writing that the Federal Circuit’s analysis of a case “fundamentally 
misunderstands what it means to infringe a [specific type of] patent”). 
17 See infra Sections I, II.a–i. 
18 Congress’s last substantial change to the patent system came in 2011 with the 
America Invents Act. See AIA, supra note 3. 
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defers to the Federal Circuit only occasionally.19 More often, the 
Court instead now reverses Federal Circuit decisions by applying 
more general legal principles rather than principles developed  
by the Federal Circuit over several decades to better resolve patent 
disputes.20 These reversals and departures from the long-term ju-
risprudence of the Federal Circuit ultimately harm the U.S. patent  
system as a whole.21 By upending what practitioners believe to  
be well-established Federal Circuit precedent22 that inventors and 
industries rely on in planning their commercial strategies, the  
Supreme Court’s actions create uncertainty, which inadvertently 
discourages certain innovation, important investment, and in some 
cases, may actually divert would-be patentees to alternative juris-
dictions like China and Europe.23 
Again, this critique is hardly new.24 What is new, however, is 
an increased sense of urgency. Aside from multiple annual reports 
from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce that the overall quality of  
the U.S. patent system has dropped significantly in recent years,25 
 
19 See infra Sections I, II.a–i. 
20 See infra Sections I, II.a–i. 
21 See Kevin Madigan, An Ever-Weakening Patent System Is Threatening the Future of 
American Innovation, CTR. FOR PROTECTION INTELL. PROP. (Apr. 28, 2017), https://cpip.
gmu.edu/2017/04/28/an-ever-weakening-patent-system-is-threatening-the-future-of-
american-innovation [https://perma.cc/L763-YZ42]; see also Gene Quinn, The Top 3 
Reasons the U.S. Patent System in Decline, IP WATCHDOG (Apr. 26, 2017), 
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/04/26/top-3-reasons-u-s-patent-system-decline/id=
82571 [https://perma.cc/G34R-YGWB]; Paul Morinville & Terry Fokas, The U.S. Patent 
System, Not China’s IP Policies, Is the Reason Behind America’s Decline in Global 
Competitiveness, IP WATCHDOG (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/03/
01/u-s-patent-system-americas-decline-competitiveness/id=94249 [https://perma.cc/
LV5P-YK4T]. 
22 The qualifier “well-established” is used solely to juxtapose a practitioner consensus 
with the Supreme Court’s apparent disagreement that the Federal Circuit jurisprudence is 
sufficiently uniform. Cf. supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra Section I.b. 
24 See sources cited supra note 7. 
25 See U.S. CHAMBER OF COM., U.S. CHAMBER INTERNATIONAL IP INDEX 117 (2017), 
http://www.theglobalipcenter.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/GIPC_IP_Index_2017_
Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/NG24-DVWX]; U.S. CHAMBER OF COM., U.S. CHAMBER 
INTERNATIONAL IP INDEX 35 (2018), http://www.theglobalipcenter.com/wp-content/up
loads/2018/02/GIPC_IP_Index_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/33Z5-EZ9C]; U.S. CHAMBER 
OF COM., U.S. CHAMBER INTERNATIONAL IP INDEX 44 (2019), https://www.theglobal
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there is also the undeniable fact that innovators are increasingly 
turning to foreign jurisdictions to seek patent protection since per-
ceived uncertainty in the U.S. patent system creates sufficient 
pause to preclude investment.26 Although the current Director of 
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”), Andrei 
Iancu, recognizes this issue and has begun acting to correct the de-
cline, his actions as Director are not sufficient alone.27 To reverse 
the patent system’s decline and restore certainty in the patent law  
jurisprudence, Congress must enact additional patent reform to 
make America’s patent system competitive again. Alternatively, 
the Supreme Court must give Federal Circuit decisions greater  
deference to prevent additional, significant upheavals of precedent 
that shock the patent system as a whole; at the very least, the  
Supreme Court must consider intellectual property (“intellectual 
property” or “IP”) rights and policy to a greater extent when decid-
ing appeals from the Federal Circuit. Thus, if the Supreme Court 
more fully considers IP rights and provides greater clarity in its 
opinions on appeal from the Federal Circuit such that no ambigui-
ties remain, the U.S. patent system would better resist abrupt 
changes that discourage inventors and minimize any ambiguities 
that would preclude patent practitioners from offering more con-
crete advice to clients. 
In advocating for a return to stability for the U.S. patent sys-
tem, this Note follows a three-part rationalization to justify its spe-
cific proposed reform. In Part I, this Note explores the roots of the  




26 See infra Section I.b; see also Gene Quinn & Eric Guttag, SCOTUS Reversals Have 
Created a Compliant Federal Circuit, IP WATCHDOG (Dec. 16, 2018), https://
www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/12/16/scotus-reversals-compliant-federal-circuit/id=103948 
[https://perma.cc/YXC4-62EW]; William New, USPTO Anticipates Slight Decline in 
Patent Filings, Including for PCT, IP WATCH (Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.ip-
watch.org/2018/02/20/uspto-anticipates-slight-decline-patent-filings-including-pct 
[https://perma.cc/M3LT-R3U6]; Morinville & Fokas, supra note 21. 
27 See James Korenchan, USPTO Director Addresses U.S. Patent System’s Decline in 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce Worldwide Patent Projection Rankings, PATENT DOCS 
(May 10, 2018), https://www.patentdocs.org/2018/05/uspto-director-addresses-us-patent-
systems-decline-in-us-chamber-of-commerce-worldwide-patent-protec.html 
[https://perma.cc/N8C2-MVT5]. 
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reviewed for patent protections, how said patent protections were  
asserted against infringers as a legal right, and how the advance-
ment of science and inventions necessitated the creation of a new 
circuit court to better adjudicate patent disputes. Part II delves into 
several of the most impactful instances of how the Supreme Court 
in the last fifteen years departed from decades-old precedent, long 
relied upon by inventors and practitioners of the patent system, 
which ultimately has weakened the patent system as a whole rela-
tive to its foreign counterparts and created unwelcome uncertainty 
amongst those already heavily invested in the U.S. system. Finally, 
Part III proposes two separate solutions to repair the U.S. patent 
system’s competitiveness: one involves targeted legislation directly 
addressing individual concerns about the patent system’s decline 
while the other entails a plea to the judiciary to minimize existing 
concerns without relying on active participation from Congress. 
I. PATENTS IN REVIEW 
A. Patent Fundamentals and the Industries That Rely on Them 
Though there are numerous treatises that review the basics of  
the U.S. patent system, an excellent summary is conveniently  
provided by Justice Tom Clark in the Supreme Court’s 1966 deci-
sion, Graham v. John Deere Co.28 As expressly written into the 
Constitution, Congress is authorized to “promote the Progress 
of . . . useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors 
the exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries.”29 In creating a patent  
system, Congress sought to spur innovation and discovery by  
incentivizing the public to create or discover new and useful  
machinery, compounds, or methods, deemed “useful arts.”30 The 
incentive lies in Congress’s grant of a patent, itself a set of exclu-
sive property rights conveyed to the inventor that rewards the  
inventor for the discovery by permitting an effective monopoly on 
 
28 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
29 See id. at 5 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). 
30 See id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952); U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., General 
Information Concerning Patents (Oct. 2015), https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-
started/general-information-concerning-patents [https://perma.cc/KL6T-FHMF]. 
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the discovered invention for a set amount of time, thus allowing 
the inventor to reap financial gains in exchange for informing the 
public about the new and useful technology.31 
Today, patent rights are generally articulated as the right to  
exclude other people or entities from doing something with the  
patent technology, whether that exclusion is a use, sale, or manu-
facture of the patented technology, but the overall premise remains 
the same, albeit for a term of twenty years today.32 At the core of 
the system was the idea that “[i]nnovation, advancement, and 
things which add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent req-
uisites in a patent system which by constitutional command must 
‘promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts.’”33 It was the line about 
“useful knowledge” that bothered Thomas Jefferson, who articu-
lated a concern that was somewhat prophetic as that prong has  
ultimately proven to be one of the most contested aspects of  
today’s patent debate.34 
When Congress first implemented a patent system by creating 
the first iteration of the USPTO with the Patent Act of 1790,35 it 
was placed within the Department of State and was to be headed 
by Jefferson, the Secretary of State at the time, as well as the  
Secretary of War and the Attorney General, collectively referred to  
as the “Commissioners for the Promotion of Useful Arts.”36 An 
applicant could secure a patent by convincing two of the three 
commissioners that their invention or discovery constituted a “use-
ful art, manufacture, . . . or device, or any improvement therein not 
before known or used . . . .”37 Jefferson, an inventor himself, was 
skeptical about what would constitute useful art, not wanting timed 
monopolies to be granted to inventors of “small details, obvious 
improvements, or frivolous devices.”38 Because he believed that 
 
31 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 5–6; see also General Information Concerning Patents, 
supra note 30. 
32 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (1952); see also General Information Concerning 
Patents, supra note 30. 
33 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 6. 
34 See id. at 9; see also infra Section I.c, f. 
35 See Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-112 (1790). 
36 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 7. 
37 Id. at 6–7. 
38 See id. at 9. 
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inventors should be entitled to some benefit for contributing to the 
public knowledge, he tempered his concern by deciding that  
patents should be granted pursuant to a high bar of patentability.39 
Jefferson recognized that in doing so, the Patent Office would need 
to articulate “a line between the things which are worth to the  
public . . . an exclusive patent, and those which are not,”40 thus 
foreshadowing the critical, modern issue of patent eligibility. 
In 1952, the patent system was revised to consider novelty,  
utility, and nonobviousness as part of the patent eligibility formula-
tion. 41  It should not come as a surprise that analysis of these  
elements was difficult at times, especially within the scientific 
fields that patents are often associated with, such as pharmaceuti-
cals, engineering, and chemical compounds. Courts would, for  
example, have to consider what might be obvious or novel about a 
particular synthesized biochemical molecule. At least one of the 
above elements, obviousness, is considered in light of what a per-
son having ordinary skill in the art (also referred to as PHOSITA), 
a legal fiction similar to the reasonably prudent man from torts, 
might know.42 If patent eligibility was therefore being determined 
in part by standards that on their face could seem a bit nebulous, 
some degree of variation among the regional courts of appeals 
would be expected, in addition to the further variation expected 
from the more numerous district judges considering each element 
at the trial level. 
In this pre-Federal Circuit version of the U.S. patent system, 
the strength and value of this exclusive property right, bestowed by 
the federal government, often based on relatively technical art, and 
judged by something of an abstract standard, would consequently 
vary depending on the circuit in which the property right was being 
asserted.43 There simply existed a “notorious difference between 
 
39 See id. at 8–9. 
40 See id. at 9. 
41 See id. at 12; see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (1952). 
42 See 35 U.S.C. § 103; U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., 2141 Examination Guidelines 
for Determining Obviousness Under 35 U.S.C. § 103 [R-08.2017] (Jan. 24, 2018), 
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2141.html [https://perma.cc/QK2V-
JDET]. 
43 See George C. Beighley, Jr., The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Has It 
Fulfilled Congressional Expectations?, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 
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the standards applied by the Patent Office and by the [regional cir-
cuit] courts”44 and it needed to be corrected if uniformity for a na-
tionally recognized right was to be established. A fact-finding 
commission was subsequently ordered to devise possible courses 
of action.45 Given the public’s fear of a specialized appellate court 
taking too much control over a particular jurisprudence, one com-
mission member proposed that they overcome the hostility with a 
merger of the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Pa-
tent Appeals. 46  These Courts already handled numerous patent  
cases while retaining jurisdiction over subject matters as well, so 
the contention was that they would be perfect tribunals for the  
assignment of patent matters.47 This proposal gained traction and 
eventually emerged as the core of the Federal Courts Improvement 
Act of 1982.48 
The formation of the Federal Circuit would prove a boon for 
the patent law community by designating a single circuit to consol-
idate the jurisprudences of the assorted regional courts and begin-
ning the construction of uniform patent law precedent for practi-
tioners to follow. Assisting in this task was a relatively laissez-
faire Supreme Court.49 For the first fifteen years of the new court’s 
existence, the Supreme Court reviewed fewer than ten Federal  
Circuit decisions,50 allowing the new expert court to develop its 
new unified jurisprudence with minimal intrusion. 
 
671, 677–78, 680 (2011); see also, e.g., Reports of the Committee on Patents, N.Y.C.  
BAR 2 (July 2015), https://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20072952-SHOULD
PATENTJURISDICTIONBEREMOVEDFROMTHEJURISDICTIONOFTHEFEDERA
LCIRCUITANDRETURNEDTOREGIONALCOURTSOFAPPEAL.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H4V5-DLR8] [hereinafter NYC Bar Report]. 
44 See NYC Bar Report, supra note 43, at 2 (citing Graham, 383 U.S. at 18). 
45 See Beighley Jr., supra note 43, at 683–89. 
46 See id. at 689–90. 
47 See id. 
48 See id. at 690, 699; see also History of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit, FED. CIR. HIST. SOC’Y, https://federalcircuithistoricalsociety.org/history
ofcourt.html [https://perma.cc/3HP3-GH5E]. 
49 See Roy Hofer, Supreme Court Reversal Rates: Evaluating the Federal Courts of 
Appeals, AM. BAR n.13 (Jan. 2010), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
migrated/intelprop/magazine/LandslideJan2010_Hofer.authcheckdam.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/D646-6GFZ]. 
50 See id. 
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Arguably the greatest beneficiaries from this new court and its 
stable jurisprudence were innovators in what are generally thought 
of as patent intensive industries: fields that rely heavily on  
proprietary products and designs to effectively compete such as 
computer hardware, electronic components, and pharmaceuticals.51 
In the present day, these industries have approximate global market 
values of $370 billion,52 $332 billion,53 and $934 billion,54 respec-
tively. Because their intellectual property could very well be freely 
misappropriated, entities in these patent-intensive fields would 
likely not be able to compete as effectively without a potent patent 
system with which to safeguard their proprietary information, and 
the entities themselves would then be arguably less incentivized to 
innovate.55 
The Federal Circuit proceeded to also simplify several of the 
standards and tests governing patent law within their new, uniform 
jurisprudence. By drawing up bright-line rules for patent cases, the 
Federal Circuit could simplify patent litigation for district courts 
 
51 See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE U.S. 
ECONOMY INDUSTRIES IN FOCUS 8 (Mar. 2012), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/
news/publications/IP_Report_March_2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/7Z89-8PJA]. 
52 Computer Hardware Global Market Report 2019, BUS. RES. CO. (Jan. 2019), 
https://www.thebusinessresearchcompany.com/report/computer-hardware-global-market-
report [https://perma.cc/8P4K-5TEP]. 
53 Active Electronic Components 2018 Global Market Net Worth US $332.20 Billion 
Forecast by 2022, MKT. WATCH (Dec. 10, 2018, 11:17 AM), https://www.market
watch.com/press-release/active-electronic-components-2018-global-market-net-worth-us-
33220-billion-forecast-by-2022-2018-12-10 [https://perma.cc/8D4G-27P2]. 
54 The Growing Pharmaceutical Market: Expert Forecasts and Analysis, MKT. RES. 
(May 16, 2018), https://blog.marketresearch.com/the-growing-pharmaceuticals-market-
expert-forecasts-and-analysis [https://perma.cc/9H9D-GC7A]. 
55 Though there is some disagreement as to the thinking that the granting of property 
rights promotes innovation, there is adequate analysis to suggest the general axiom is 
true. See generally Zorina Khan & Kenneth Sokoloff, Schemes of Practical Utility:  
Entrepreneurship and Innovation Among “Great Investors” in the United States, 1790–
1865, NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RES. (1992); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE 
INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 
(2003), available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/promote-
innovation-proper-balance-competition-and-patent-law-and-policy/innovationrpt.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X57W-YX3L]; David Kline, Do Patents Really Promote Innovation?, 
MICHELSON INST. FOR INTELL. PROP. (Apr. 24, 2017), https://michelsonip.com/patents-
really-promote-innovation/ [https://perma.cc/ZMC6-RVHD]. 
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by making legal determinations more straightforward.56 The Fed-
eral Circuit therein began cementing the norms of patent litigation 
procedure in such a way that patent holders could be more confi-
dent in the validity of their patent, not having to worry as much 
about uncertainty within the law later invalidating said patent.57 
This was particularly useful with regard to patent eligibility.  
Arguably one of the most important issues when discussing the 
prevailing uncertainties in patent law, eligibility is the very basis 
upon which a petitioner can procure a patent.58 Just as Thomas Jef-
ferson was concerned about what type of high bar of patentability 
should apply in the early days of the Republic,59 patent applicants 
today still consider the very same question.60 After the creation of 
the Federal Circuit, patent applicants could breathe a little easier 
knowing that interpretation of the critical patent eligibility statute 
was left to a single circuit centered around the idea of patent spe-
cialization. Consequently, until 1997, the Federal Circuit seemed 
well-grounded and patent precedent was sufficiently stable.61 
B. The Supreme Court’s Newfound Interest and Effect of Its 
Reversals 
The second fifteen years of the Federal Circuit’s existence,  
however, saw a sharp reversal in the relatively minimal oversight 
that the specialized appellate court had so far enjoyed. In contrast 
to the Federal Circuit’s early years, the fifteen year period between 
1997 and 2012 saw roughly twenty patent cases taken up by the  
Supreme Court, three times what was reviewed between 1982 and 
 
56 See Steven Seidenburg, Tug-of-War Over Interpretations of Patent Law Continues 
Between Federal Circuit and SCOTUS, ABA J. (Jan. 1, 2016, 3:00 AM), http://
www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/tug_of_war_over_interpretations_of_patent_law_
continues_between_federal [https://perma.cc/B377-HLAN]; see also David Forman, Why 
Does the U.S. Supreme Court Keep Reversing the Federal Circuit?, OSHA LIANG  
(Mar. 31, 2017), https://oshaliang.com/newsletter/why-does-the-u-s-supreme-court-keep-
reversing-the-federal-circuit/ [https://perma.cc/9ZX4-C7TW]. 
57 See generally sources cited supra note 56. 
58 See generally 34 U.S.C. § 101 (1952). 
59 See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1966). 
60 See infra Sections II.d–e. 
61 See infra Section I.b. 
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1997.62 While the Court had seemingly left the Federal Circuit 
alone in the early years to develop its technical acumen and create 
uniformity in the patent law, the Supreme Court’s frequent inter-
pretation in patent cases between 1997 and 2012 reflects a concern 
that the lower court had gone too far in specializing the law and 
strayed away from the general principles that govern all law.63 One 
could look at such a reaction as an attempt to meld the general 
body of law and its focus on justice and equity with the clear, spe-
cific principles of Federal Circuit jurisprudence developed to em-
phasize certainty over traditional equity. 
As mentioned previously, since 1997, the Supreme Court has 
steadily taken on more appeals from the Federal Circuit.64 Alt-
hough the proportionally smaller Federal Circuit reviews only a 
slight fraction of all the federal appeal filings in the nation—1,528 
cases or 2.98% of all federal appeal filings in 2017—its decisions 
are more frequently taking up a larger, disproportionate amount of 
space on the Supreme Court’s docket.65 In 2016, appeals from the 
Federal Circuit comprised 14% of the high court’s docket.66 The 
clear takeaway is that the Supreme Court is now willing to be more 
hands-on with the Federal Circuit. 
This newfound willingness to review patent decisions more  
frequently and to bring patent jurisprudence in line with the  
general law has consequently led to numerous important tenets of 
patent law being reversed 67  and, in turn, weakening the patent  
system.68 This includes issues such as patent eligibility, the funda-
mental right to exclude, the strength of patent rights overseas, and 
 
62 See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Michael Risch & Camilla Hrdy, Supreme Court 
Patent Cases, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION, https://writtendescription.blogspot.com/p/patents-
scotus.html [https://perma.cc/4WZK-LSSV]. 
63 See Seidenburg, supra note 56; see also Andrew Chung, Supreme Court and Top 
Patent Court Rarely See Eye to Eye, REUTERS (June 19, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-usa-court-patents/supreme-court-and-top-patent-court-rarely-see-eye-to-eye-
idUSKBN19A34I [https://perma.cc/CM8J-V9E9]. 
64 See Adam Feldman, Empirical SCOTUS: The Heightened Importance of the Federal 
Circuit, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/12/empirical-
scotus-the-heightened-importance-of-the-federal-circuit/ [https://perma.cc/N5J7-EQGW]. 
65 See id. 
66 See id. 
67 See generally infra Section III. 
68 See generally infra Section III. 
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more.69 This conclusion that the system is weakening is also not 
one reached solely by practitioners, but by former judicial figures 
as well. Former Chief Judge Paul Michel of the Federal Circuit, 
who retired in 2010, reflected that the “patent system has been 
weakened, and as far as [I am] concerned the Supreme Court is 
unaware of that.”70 
This trend of reversals and subsequent weakening of the  
overall system has in fact benefited some parties, particularly  
companies that are frequent targets of non-practicing entities71—
colloquially known as “patent trolls.”72 Judge Michel opined that 
American commerce as a whole is bound to be negatively impact-
ed by this trend, resulting in the diminished certainty of patent 
rights, in turn leading to hesitancy in further investment, scaled 
back research,  and reduced innovation,73  a prediction that has 
more or less already come to fruition.74 
The Global Innovation Policy Center (“GIPC”), a self-reported 
affiliate of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 75  began releasing  
annual assessments of IP law in the United States relative to for-
eign nations in 2012.76 In its 2016 edition, the United States was 
tied for first place with regard to the overall quality of its patent 
 
69 See generally infra Section III. 
70 Chung, supra note 63. 
71 See id. 
72 The term “patent troll” generally refers to a person or commercial entity that holds 
one or more patents, but engages in very little, if any, actual commerce with it. See 
Dennis Crouch, What Is a Patent Troll and Why Are They Bad?, PATENTLYO (Mar. 6, 
2009), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2009/03/what-is-a-troll-patent-and-why-are-they-
bad.html [https://perma.cc/WA8Q-XHJ3]. The troll instead asserts the patent(s) against 
other commercial entities who often are not infringing directly or even at all with the goal 
of negotiating a license agreement. See id. The size of the entity the trolls makes 
assertions against and the degree to which the patent invention is a part of the larger 
entity’s business are significant factors in a troll’s decision of who to assert the patent 
against. See id. 
73 See Chung, supra note 63. 
74 See sources cited supra note 25 (confirming the general, downward trend of the U.S. 
patent system as diminishing in strength and quality relative to foreign jurisdictions). 
75 Global Innovation Policy Center, GIPC, https://www.theglobalipcenter.com/ 
[https://perma.cc/62NR-LVVX]. 
76 See generally Global Innovation Policy Index, KAUFMAN FOUND. (Mar. 2012), 
http://www2.itif.org/2012-global-innovation-policy-index.pdf?_ga=2.92510557.
175042246.1570140631-1533524264.1570140631 [https://perma.cc/XK3H-ZX39]. 
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system, scoring 6.5 out of a possible 7 points, along with the Unit-
ed Kingdom (“UK”), Switzerland, Sweden, Singapore, Germany, 
and France.77 However, the GIPC’s assessment of the U.S. patent 
system fell to tenth place in 2017 by scoring 7 points out of a pos-
sible 8, tying with Hungary.78 It subsequently fell again in 2018 to 
twelfth place, tying Italy with 7.25 out of a possible 8.79 In review-
ing this subjective ranking, it is worth noting that although other 
publications have questioned the GIPC’s methodology as flawed 
by utilizing vague criteria to convey a narrative desired by a spe-
cial interest group to justify patent reform,80 it remains useful in at 
least illustrating the global IP stage in the aggregate. From this per-
spective, one can identify the underlying areas of the U.S. patent 
system that have declined in quality as a forum to assert IP rights 
relative to other nations.81 
China, as an example, has seemingly embraced several areas of 
patentable material that the United States has avoided in granting 
patents, such as software and business method patents.82 By com-
bining this broader scope of patentability, a 90% probability of a 
patent owner securing injunctive relief in an infringement case 
where there has been a finding of infringement,83 and a specialized, 
fast-tracked court specifically for patents,84  it is understandable 
that China is growing into a hotbed for innovation. Whereas an av-
 
77 See U.S. CHAMBER OF COM., U.S. CHAMBER INTERNATIONAL IP INDEX27 (2016), 
https://www.theglobalipcenter.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/GIPC_Index_Report_
2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/HCB4-8B8Q]. 
78 See 2017 IP INDEX, supra note 25, at 117. 
79 See 2018 IP INDEX, supra note 25, at 35. 
80 See Richard Lloyd, IP Index Showing Decline in the US Patent System Lacks 
Credibility, Claims Unified COO, IAM (June 8, 2018), https://www.iam-media.com/law-
policy/ip-index-showing-decline-us-patent-system-lacks-credibility-claims-unified-coo 
[https://perma.cc/NZA8-UMCT]. 
81 See generally Quinn, supra note 7; New, supra note 26 (wherein the Secretariat of 
the World Intellectual Property Organization found the United States to still be the world 
leader in IP law, but suffering a decline in its overall scores from the previous year); 
Gene Quinn, Iancu: USPTO Guidance Gets 101 Right; Time for Courts to Follow Suit,  
IP WATCHDOG (May 7, 2019), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/05/07/iancu-uspto-
guidance-gets-101-right-time-courts-follow-suit/id=109015/ [https://perma.cc/WSL2-
SJE7][hereinafter Quinn, Iancu]. 
82 See Madigan, supra note 21. 
83 See id. 
84 See Morinville & Fokas, supra note 21. 
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erage patent litigation case in the United States can often cost over 
$3 million over the course of five or more years, the specialized 
patent courts in China can resolve a dispute for around $200,000 in 
less than a year.85 
Even though American companies are on record as disliking 
how disputes in China often require a transfer of patent rights to 
their Chinese affiliates, it is arguably worthwhile given that injunc-
tive relief was granted in approximately 100% of patent infringe-
ment actions filed in China by foreign firms when there was a  
finding of infringement as opposed to patent litigation in the  
United States where infringement is far more likely to be met with 
only a compulsory licensing fee.86 Accordingly, while China reaps 
the benefits of this attractive patent venue, the continued weaken-
ing of the U.S. system has resulted in a reported 62% decrease in 
venture capital investments.87 
To offer one additional point of reference as to a measure of a 
patent system’s strength, a brief look at the European continent is 
in order. The European Union (“EU”), the political bloc of more 
than two dozen European countries which include some of the 
world’s largest commercial markets like Germany and France, is in 
the process of implementing a Unified Patent Court (“UPC”), a 
forum wherein litigants can assert claims from patents granted by 
the European Patent Office in a common court with jurisdiction 
over all Member States.88 Meant to preside over all EU patent dis-
putes with a uniform jurisprudence of law and comparatively easy 
access to injunctive relief with the means to efficiently enforce  
rulings across the bloc,89 a constitutional challenge in Germany is 
the only remaining impediment to the UPC’s implementation.90 
 
85 See id. 
86 See id. 
87 See id. 




89 See generally id. 
90 See Vincent Look, What to Know in the Lead-Up to Brexit and the Unitary Patent 
System, IP WATCHDOG (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/04/10/know-
lead-brexit-unitary-patent-system/id=108135/ [https://perma.cc/T4ME-23RW]. 
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Although the departure of the UK from the bloc on January 31, 
2020 pursuant to the Brexit Withdrawal Agreement91 could also 
complicate implementation, the UK had already ratified the UPC 
agreement in April 2018.92 Since then, the UK has not expressly 
indicated any intent to withdraw, a stance that head of the Prepara-
tory Committee for the UPC Alexander Ramsay sees as permitting 
the implementation of the UPC with the UK as a contracting state 
under treaty law, not EU law.93 Should that eventuality occur, a 
favorable decision from the German constitutional court would 
thereby pave the way for a single forum in which to address patent 
disputes across a massive geographical market and in a far more 
efficient manner than the U.S. system in its current state. Taken in 
the aggregate, these streamlined procedures and specialized venues 
present further evidence that the U.S. patent system is becoming 
less efficient and desirable for enforcing patent rights.94 
 
91 See Jill Lawless, After Brexit: UK Leaves EU but What’s Next Far from  
Certain, ASSOC. PRESS (Jan. 31, 2020), https://apnews.com/d0a718b09516c6610746773e 
7a4bcfd3 [https://perma.cc/YQ58-RJVH]. 
92 See Alan Johnson, UK Ratifies the UPC Agreement, BRISTOWS (Apr. 26, 2018), 
https://www.bristowsupc.com/latest-news/uk-ratifies-the-upc-agreement 
[https://perma.cc/4W8L-EYTH]. 
93 See Unified Patent Court Could Start in Early 2021—With UK, PATENT- UND 
RECHTSANWALTSKANZLEI (Dec. 2, 2019), https://legal-patent.com/patent-law/unified-
patent-court-could-start-in-early-2021-with-uk/ [https://perma.cc/4QJJ-7GF5]; see also 
Amy Sandys, The UPC Will Be Operational in Early 2021, JUVE-PATENT (Nov. 28, 
2019), https://www.juve-patent.com/news-and-stories/people-and-business/the-upc-will-
be-operational-in-early-2021/ [https://perma.cc/86M8-WFTP]. 
94     In the week immediately prior to this Note’s publication, well after it had 
originally been drafted, the United Kingdom reversed its intention of participating in the 
UPC system following Brexit. The UK formally left the EU on January 31, 2020, 
pursuant to the recently passed Brexit Withdrawal Agreement, and soon thereafter 
published on February 27, 2020 a series of guidelines it intended to utilize during its 
negotiations with the EU to establish post-Brexit relations. See OFFICE OF THE PRIME 
MINISTER, THE FUTURE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EU, CP211, ¶¶ 1–3 (UK). In particular, 
the British government stated that it would “not agree to any obligation for [UK] laws to 
be aligned with the EU’s, or for the EU’s institutions, including the Court of Justice, to 
have any jurisdiction in the UK.” See id. at ¶ 5. A spokesman for the British government 
later confirmed that “the UK [would] not be seeking involvement in the [UPC] system” 
as doing so would be “inconsistent with [the government’s] aims of becoming an 
independent self-governing nation.” See Joff Wild, The UK Will Not Be Part of the  
UPC, Government Confirms to IAM, INTELLECTUAL ASSET MGMT. (Feb. 27, 2020), 
https://www.iammedia.com/law-policy/uk-no-upc [https://perma.cc/7S3Y-HACP]. 
Although this recent reversal leaves the future of the UPC in question, it does not 
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It is therefore clear that there are other attractive forums around 
the world besides the United States in which global innovators can 
invest, not only with relatively more efficient venues in which to 
address disputes, but also with a higher probability of a favorable 
outcome. The increasing appeal of these forums abroad will only 
continue to surpass that of the United States so long as the U.S.  
patent system remains mired in uncertainty and precedent rever-
sals. To counteract this detracting force and reassert confidence in 
the U.S. system, it becomes imperative to craft remedial measures 
that fully address the current disagreements in jurisprudence   
between the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit since these 
disputes give rise to legal uncertainty, undermining the U.S. patent 
system as a whole. 
II. PATENTLY SHOCKING CHANGES 
Although all Supreme Court decisions on patent law by nature 
will invariably have an impact on the patent system, some cases in 
particular produce more dynamic changes than others. The follow-
ing cases, chosen to illustrate key changes in patent law, demon-
strate instances since 1997 when the Supreme Court reversed  
a decision of the Federal Circuit and caused a shift in the practice 
of patent law severe enough that it ultimately influenced overall 
commercial strategy in the United States. In selecting these spe-
cific patent cases from the high court, this Note focuses on deci-
sions that altered a critical part of U.S. patent litigation, commer-
cial ownership, or the fundamental concept of patentability. 
A. The Right to Exclude Is Significantly Impaired—eBay (2006) 
Arguably the first case since the inception of the Federal Cir-
cuit to really upend U.S. patent jurisprudence and diminish confi-
dence therein, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC95 altered the fun-
 
diminish the reality that implementation of this unified court, which would permit the 
uniform adjudication of patent claims across dozens of countries with more efficient 
remedies, was arguably imminent and only disrupted on account of wider trade 
negotiations. Accordingly, this recent setback should not be seen as diminishing the 
importance of the U.S. patent system’s decline. 
95 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
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damental ability of a patent holder to exclude others from using 
patented material by discarding the Federal Circuit’s liberal grants 
of injunctive relief and replacing it instead with the traditional 
four-factor test of equity used in injunction disputes outside of pa-
tent law.96 
The case began when MercExchange, a non-practicing entity, 
retained a portfolio of patents and asserted several against eBay, a 
well-known online auction site that allows users to sell and buy 
goods amongst each other.97 One of the asserted patents was U.S. 
Patent No. 5,845,265, a business method patent covering the con-
signment of goods in a computerized market, a key aspect of 
eBay’s platform.98 A jury trial subsequently found the patent valid 
and that eBay had infringed it, whereupon the district court judge 
granted an award of damages but denied MercExchange’s request 
for injunctive relief.99 On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the 
district court, stating that “the general rule is that a permanent in-
junction will issue once infringement and validity have been  
adjudged” since the “right to exclude recognized in a patent is but 
the essence of the concept of property,” and in fact cited its own 
sixteen-year-old precedent to further emphasize the existence of 
the general rule.100 The Federal Circuit acknowledged that the pub-
lic interest or other compelling reasons could justify a trial judge 
exercising discretion within the bounds of 35 U.S.C. § 283 and 
denying permanent injunction relief, but found no such reason to 
do so in the eBay dispute.101 
On review, the Supreme Court evaluated and discarded this 
bright-line test, explaining that neither the district court nor the 
Federal Circuit properly applied “traditional equitable principles” 
 
96 See id. at 393–94. 
97 See id. at 390. 
98 See id.; see also U.S. Patent No. 5,845,265. 
99 eBay, 547 U.S. at 390–91. 
100 See MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing 
Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1246–47 (Fed. Cir. 1989)). 
101 See eBay, 547 U.S. at 393–94 (citing MercExchange, 401 F.3d at 1339); see also 35 
U.S.C. § 283 (1952) (“Injunction—The several courts having jurisdiction of cases under 
this title [35 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.] may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of 
equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms as the court 
deems reasonable.”) (emphasis added). 
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by considering whether “(1) [the plaintiff] has suffered an irrepa-
rable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary 
damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, 
considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and  
defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public 
interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.”102 In 
overruling the Federal Circuit’s general rule of granting permanent 
injunctions liberally, the Supreme Court inherently diminished one 
of the most fundamental aspects of a patent holder’s rights: the 
ability to exclude. 
By firmly tying a district court’s ability to grant injunctive  
relief to the traditional four-factor test, the commonly perceived 
adequacy of monetary damages to remedy infringement routinely 
precludes permanent injunctive relief.103 Moreover, the availability 
and relatively straightforward calculations of monetary damages in 
such cases, often where businesses keep extensive records of  
financial figures and have already considered licensing terms  
internally, has effectively created what is in some ways a compul-
sory licensing system.104 For example, if half of a company’s busi-
ness depends on an infringed patent, then half of that company’s 
revenue could be awarded as adequate damages. While this relief 
may satisfy ordinary notions of equity, the patent owner’s funda-
mental right to exclude has still been severely abridged. 
 
102 See MercExchange, 547 U.S. at 391, 393. Further, the Supreme Court commented 
on the lower court’s remarks about a party’s “lack of commercial activity in practicing 
the patents” and found that such a factor may be used in consideration of the four-factor 
test[] but is not dispositive alone. Id. at 393. 
103 Compare S.O.I.TEC Silicon On Insulator Techs., S.A. v. MEMC Elec. Materials, 
Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76169 (D. Del. July 13, 2011) (wherein injunctive relief was 
denied upon finding total damages could conceivably be satisfied with monetary 
damages), with Evonik Degussa Gmbh v. Materia, Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126909 
(D. Del. Aug. 9, 2017) (granting injunctive relief where a competitive relationship 
between the parties and an absolute unwillingness to license the subject patent satisfied 
the eBay test). 
104 See R. David Donoghue Will eBay v. MercExchange Lead to Compulsory 
Licensing?, CHI. IP LITIG. (Jan. 21, 2008), https://www.chicagoiplitigation.com/2008/01/
will-ebay-v-mercexchange-lead-to-compulsory-licensing/ [https://perma.cc/GE2T-
MJYF]. 
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As noted already,105 a U.S. patent at its core is a grant of exclu-
sive property rights from the U.S. government in exchange for in-
novation that benefits the public; of these property rights, the most 
important right is the right to exclude in order to effectuate the 
temporary monopoly that the Founders originally intended.106 In  
restricting a patentee’s ability to exclude, the Supreme Court took 
the first step in weakening the U.S. patent system by severely  
hampering access to a remedy integral to the fundamental benefit 
that incentivizes so many innovators and inventors to seek a patent 
in the first place.107 This shortfall is made all the more glaring in 
light of foreign jurisdictions now promoting easier access to the 
same remedy.108 Consequently, eBay is viewed by many as the first 
of many recent harmful decisions by the high court.109 
B. Predictability Bleeds into the Test for Obviousness—KSR 
(2007) 
The next major shock to the U.S. patent system came a year  
after eBay, when the Supreme Court took up review of KSR Inter-
national Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,110 a case involving obviousness. In 
this dispute, Teleflex was the holder of U.S. Patent No. 6,237,565 
B1, an adjustable pedal assembly with electronic throttle control.111 
The patent invention comprised an adjustable automobile pedal 
with a mounted electronic sensor that fed data about the pedal’s 
position to a processor that controlled the throttle of a vehicle’s 
engine.112 Teleflex asserted this patent against its competitor KSR 
whose pedal Teleflex believed to infringe its patent.113 Arguing 
that Teleflex’s patent was merely the combination of two pieces  
of prior art, one comprising an adjustable pedal and another com-
 
105 See supra notes 29–34 and accompanying text. 
106 See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966). 
107 See supra Section I.b. 
108 See supra Section I.b. 
109 See Gene Quinn, Seeds of Demise Were Sown When SCOTUS Removed Exclusivity 
from the Patent Bargain, IP WATCHDOG (Sept. 19, 2018), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/
2018/09/19/seeds-demise-scotus-removed-exclusivity-patent-bargain/id=101492/ 
[https://perma.cc/Z4HN-94EQ]. 
110 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
111 See id. at 405–06; see also U.S. Patent No. 6,237,565 B1. 
112 See KSR, 550 U.S. at 406. 
113 See id. at 411–12. 
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prising a means of mounting a sensor atop a pedal, KSR disputed 
this alleged infringement.114 
At trial, the district court granted summary judgment for KSR 
and followed the test for obviousness laid out in Graham115 to find 
that Teleflex’s patent was indeed a simple combination of the prior 
art.116 The district court proceeded to then utilize the teaching-
suggestion-motivation (“TSM”) test required by Federal Circuit 
precedent wherein validity is determined based on whether there 
existed any suggestion or motivation to combine prior art into the 
present invention.117 Although the district court found that the prior 
art offered sufficient motivation to combine prior elements into the 
present claim, the Federal Circuit later reversed the grant of sum-
mary judgment and held that the TSM test was improperly applied 
because the district court had failed to make specific findings as to 
any suggestion or motivation to attach a sensor to a pedal.118 
The Supreme Court, on review, again reversed the Federal Cir-
cuit, this time ruling that the Federal Circuit had placed too much 
emphasis on the TSM test and that a narrow application of the test 
was incongruous with the high court’s precedent in Graham.119 In 
applying the TSM test in such a rigid manner, the Federal Circuit 
had apparently omitted the emphasis on a “functional approach” as 
stated in Graham.120 Though the Court’s ultimate ruling on the 
matter of obviousness more or less reiterated what Graham had set 
forth fifty years prior,121 it also constituted an apparent admonition 
of the Federal Circuit’s preference for bright-line rules. No longer 
would obviousness rely on a singular test, but would now instead 
be considered in light of numerous rationales, later articulated in 
 
114 See id. 
115 See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966) (requiring courts determining 
obviousness to consider (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) the differences 
between the present invention and the prior art; and (3) the level of ordinary skill in the 
art). 
116 See KSR, 550 U.S. at 413. 
117 See id. at 413. 
118 See Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int’l Co., 119 Fed. App’x 282, 286–88 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
119 See KSR, 550 U.S. at 415. 
120 See id. 
121 See id. at 426–27. 
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USPTO examiner guidelines compliant with KSR.122 The problem 
here, though, is that this Supreme Court reversal again created new 
uncertainty in U.S. patent law. 
Whether the TSM test was too rigidly applied or not in this par-
ticular case, it was a single, clear test with which an inventor could 
consider their invention and decide whether pursuing a patent was 
worthwhile. Prior to KSR, if the inventor considered the TSM test 
carefully and was honest in assessing the novelty of their own  
invention, they could be relatively confident as to whether it would 
pass a scrutiny of obviousness and be considered valid.123  The  
Supreme Court’s ruling in KSR thus created additional uncertainty 
which further diminished the strength of the overall patent system 
by no longer utilizing a clear, bright-line test in § 103 obviousness 
inquiries. 
C. Limiting the Effectiveness of Exhaustion Agreements in Patent 
License Agreements–Quanta (2008) 
It again took just one year after its last splash for the Supreme 
Court to review and overturn additional patent precedent, this time 
in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc. with the patent 
exhaustion doctrine.124 Here, LG was the owner of several patents 
covering microprocessor chips for use in computing, as well as  
additional method patents covering the usage of said chips. 125 
When it licensed these patents to Intel, LG stipulated in a separate 
agreement that the license did not cover any products made by 
combining LG chips with non-LG or non-Intel components and 
required Intel to give its customers notice of this stipulation.126 
This allowed LG to later assert a conceivable claim to try and col-
lect royalties from any of Intel’s buyers who subsequently utilized 
 
122 See 2141 Examination Guidelines, supra note 42. 
123 See Tina Hulse, Esther Lim & Ningling Wang, Implications of KSR in Prosecution 
and Litigation: The Standard of Obviousness Under 35 U.S.C. § 103, MANAGING INTELL. 
PROP. (Mar. 2008), https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/implications-of-ksr-in-
prosecution-and-litigation-the-standard.html [https://perma.cc/NF2X-GADN]. 
124 553 U.S. 617, 621 (2007). 
125 See id. 
126 See id. at 623–24. 
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the licensed chips. 127  Accordingly, when Quanta purchased li-
censed chips from Intel, Intel gave the requisite notice and Quanta 
proceeded to manufacture its computers for sale in such a way that 
infringed LG’s method patents.128 
In the ensuing litigation, the district court granted summary 
judgment to Quanta and found that LG’s license agreement with 
Intel invoked the exhaustion doctrine129 wherein an authorized sale  
exhausts all patent rights in that item, applying this doctrine to the 
physical chips but not the method claims.130 The Federal Circuit 
agreed with regard to the inapplicability of the doctrine to method 
claims, though the court cited its own precedent in finding that ver-
tical restraint clauses in patent licenses were permissible.131 Upon 
review, the Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit’s ruling 
and found that Intel’s authorized sale of the chips, a patented  
component that had no reasonable non-infringing use, triggered 
exhaustion since LG was unable to suggest any use for the chips 
that did not in some way practice LG’s method patents.132 
The ruling in Quanta, though not as impactful on the patent  
landscape as a whole like eBay or KSR, still imposed a significant  
restriction on the ability of patent holders to retain control of their 
patented matter through contract. Though post-sale restraints on 
the sale of actual, patented products were already fairly restrict-
ed,133 restrictions on the application of method claims had been 
less than clear. Now, even where express, agreed-upon terms are 
set forth in the license agreement, patent holders still relinquish 
more control of their innovations than was previously permissible. 
 
127 See Hana Bae & Courtney Zanocco, Quanta Computer v. LG Electronics: Supreme 
Court Bulletin, CORNELL LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/06-
937 [https://perma.cc/PP3X-X34U]. 
128 See Quanta, 553 U.S. at 624. 
129 See id. at 625 (“[The] doctrine of patent exhaustion provides that the initial 
authorized sale of a patented item terminates all patent rights to that item.”). 
130 See id. at 624–25. 
131 See LG Elecs., Inc. v. Bizcom Elecs., Inc., 453 F.3d 1364, 1369–70 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
Vertical restraint clauses refer to express conditions set forth in sale agreements or 
licenses that limit the rights conferred upon the licensee. See id.; see also Mallinckrodt, 
Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 706 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
132 See Quanta, 553 U.S. at 631. 
133 See generally Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453 (1873). 
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This additional erosion of a patentee’s rights further diminishes the 
value of a U.S. patent by limiting the desirable commercial licens-
ing opportunities available. 
D. Natural Phenomena and Diagnostic Methods Involving 
Natural Phenomena Deemed Ineligible for Patent Protection—
Mayo, Myriad (2012–13) 
The next major change from the Supreme Court came in 2012 
with Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, 
Inc.134 and in 2013 with Association for Molecular Pathology v. 
Myriad Genetics, Inc.135 Both cases involved multiple trips to the 
Supreme Court and both cases resulted in reversals of previously 
stable Federal Circuit precedent. 
In Mayo, Prometheus Labs owned a pair of diagnostic method 
patents consisting of steps taken to determine an appropriate dos-
age of medication.136 Specifically, they involved taking unpatenta-
ble natural laws like the relationship between metabolites and the 
efficacy of a pharmaceutical drug 137  and creating a patentable 
method by describing how one determines a dosage for an auto- 
immune condition, first by administering a reactive drug to the  
patient and then by measuring the overall presence of the drug to 
compute an appropriate dosage.138 
In Myriad, Myriad Genetics secured several patents after iso-
lating the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes—genetic mutations linked to 
a heightened risk of breast and ovarian cancers—and subsequently  
determining their exact location and sequence.139 These patents,  
if valid, would permit Myriad to exclude others from isolating this  
important gene, as well as excluding others from producing syn-
thetic BRCA genes.140 
Both cases involved challenges to patents on § 101 patent eli-
gibility grounds. The Prometheus patent was challenged as failing 
 
134 See 566 U.S. 66, 92 (2012). 
135 See 569 U.S. 576, 596 (2013). 
136 See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 74–75. 
137 See id. at 77. 
138 See id. at 74–75. 
139 See Myriad, 569 U.S. at 583. 
140 See id. at 585. 
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to substantially transform a law of nature and the Myriad patent 
was challenged as claiming a natural phenomenon.141 The respec-
tive district courts found in favor of the challengers in both cases, 
invalidating the subject patents as ineligible.142 With regard to the 
claims about patenting what were arguably natural laws, the Feder-
al Circuit reversed the lower courts in both cases. In Mayo, the 
Federal Circuit found that the claims consisted of more than “data 
gathering” by claiming multiple transformations inherent to the 
process wherein the administration of a drug caused a qualifying 
change in the patient, followed by a physical measurement to 
gauge the first transformation.143 In Myriad, the Federal Circuit 
similarly opined that there was sufficient transformation to satisfy 
patent eligibility as isolated genes outside of the body should be 
considered chemically different from genes in their natural state, in 
keeping with USPTO policy.144 
The Mayo case went up to the Supreme Court while Myriad 
was still being decided, but both were originally vacated and re-
manded for further consideration: Mayo to be reconsidered in light 
of Bilski v. Kappos, 145  which found that the machine-transfor-
mation test was not to be used as the sole means of determining 
whether a process is patentable, and Myriad to be considered in 
light of the first Supreme Court review of Mayo.146 When the Fed-
eral Circuit reviewed both cases on remand, it remained steadfast 
and asserted that the claims in both cases were still patentable.147 
Both cases were then again submitted for further review by the Su-
preme Court and review was granted in both instances.148 
 
141 See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 75–76; Myriad, 569 U.S. at 586. 
142 See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 75–76; Myriad, 569 U.S. at 583. 
143 See Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1343 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009). 
144 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 
1329, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
145 561 U.S. 593, 593 (2010). 
146 See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 76; Myriad, 569 U.S. at 589. 
147 See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 76; Myriad, 569 U.S. at 589. 
148 See Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 
(2012); Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 
(2013). 
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In Mayo, the Supreme Court held that the diagnostic proce-
dures present, given that they involved unpatentable laws of  
nature, were not sufficiently transformative to qualify for patent 
eligibility as Prometheus had simply written “instructions [that] 
add nothing specific to the laws of nature[.]”149 A similar disposi-
tion followed in Myriad a year later when a second Supreme Court 
review found that the mere act of isolating DNA was also not suf-
ficiently transformative. 150  The Federal Circuit had originally  
asserted that there was sufficient transformation when a DNA 
strand’s covalent bonds were severed, the end molecule thus  
undergoing a qualifying change to constitute a transformation.151 
On review, the Supreme Court found that mere isolation is not 
transformative enough to warrant the patenting of natural genes, 
though it did provide that an artificial alteration of natural genes, 
such as cDNA, would remain eligible for a patent.152 
The full effect of Mayo and Myriad would not be felt until a 
year later when Alice completed the trio of cases that collectively 
threw the understood idea of modern patent eligibility out the win-
dow. 153  Mayo and Myriad, however, were sufficient to prompt 
immediate doubt from several of the more prominent industries 
like bio-research and diagnostics, also calling into question the va-
lidity of many patents in these fields.154 The actual valuations of 
patents in these fields consequently dropped simply by existing in 
a grey area as innovators and buyers of patents recognized that pa-
tents in these fields were more likely to be invalidated at some 
point in the future given a post-grant review, even without formal 
adjudication as to validity.155 This quantitative measure of uncer-
tainty, total change in valuation, was the result of risk-adjusted 
present value—i.e., the estimated change in worth of a commodity 
 
149 See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 82. 
150 See Myriad, 569 U.S. at 586–87. 
151 See id. 
152 See id. at 593–95. 
153 See infra Section III.e. 
154 See Sean Sheridan, How Mayo, Myriad and Alice May Impact Patent Valuations, 
CHARLES RIVER ASSOCIATES (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.crai.com/sites/default/files/
publications/How-Mayo-Myriad-And-Alice-May-Impact-Patent-Valuations.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WC4Z-ZUPV]. 
155 See id. 
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given assorted factors related to its market—and is a somewhat 
tangible measure of how the U.S. patent system was changing.156 
Mayo and Myriad arguably best exemplify the concerns of  
legal practitioners who worry that the Federal Circuit too often gets 
stuck down “in the technical weeds” rather than considering the 
“broader legal and policy implications,” a consideration that possi-
bly leads to increased review by the Supreme Court.157 
E. Mass Invalidation of “Abstract Idea” Patents—Alice (2014) 
Alice Corps. v. CLS Bank International,158 together with eBay, 
are arguably the two cases most responsible for weakening the 
U.S. patent system as a whole given that they ushered in two of the 
most sweeping changes. At the heart of Alice was a business meth-
od patent related to managing financial risk using a “computer-
implemented scheme for mitigating ‘settlement risk’ (i.e., the risk 
that only one party to a financial transaction will pay what it 
owes) . . . .”159 The method patent centered around the use of a 
computer as an intermediary to create “shadow” credit and debit 
records, which were regularly updated with the real-life records of 
transacting parties.160 The system subsequently relied on the com-
puter records to act as a gatekeeper for transactions as a whole and 
only allowed transactions when the shadow records contained suf-
ficient funds to properly process a transaction.161 
CLS Bank, an operator of global transaction services, sought a 
declaratory judgment of non-infringement from the courts while 
the Alice Corporation asserted that CLS had infringed its patent.162 
Siding with CLS, the district court found that the claims were inva-
lid because “they [were] directed to the abstract idea of ‘employing  
a neutral intermediary to facilitate simultaneous exchange of obli-
 
156 Id. 
157 See Krista Cox, Oracle v. Google Is More Evidence the Federal Circuit Has No 
Business Deciding Copyright Cases, ABOVE L. (Mar. 29, 2018), https://abovethelaw.com/
2018/03/oracle-v-google-is-more-evidence-that-the-federal-circuit-has-no-business-
deciding-copyright-cases/ [https://perma.cc/ZBE7-6VN8]. 
158 573 U.S. 208 (2014). 
159 See id. at 212. 
160 See id. at 213–14. 
161 See id. 
162 See id. at 214. 
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gations in order to minimize risk.’”163 Upon first review by the  
Federal Circuit, the three-judge panel ruled 2–1 and reversed the  
district court’s invalidation, finding that Alice’s claims were suffi-
ciently directed toward patentable subject matter.164 However, the 
Federal Circuit agreed to hear the case again en banc, this time  
reversing the earlier panel and affirming the original invalidation 
by the district court by a five judge plurality.165 The en banc panel 
was split with seven opinions written in total.166 However, by rec-
ognizing that invalidation at the appellate level was inappropriate 
as it would likely lead to “retroactively invalidat[ing] tens of thou-
sands of . . . patents” given the abstract nature of many patents, 
particularly software, the dissent of Circuit Judges O’Malley and 
Linn would eventually prove prophetic. 167  The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari and the premonition about mass invalidation 
would essentially be proven right. 
One year after the en banc Federal Circuit rehearing, the  
Supreme Court held the claims of Alice’s patent to be ineligible as 
they simply directed an abstract idea like risk management to a  
generic intermediary like a computer.168 Had the case been left at 
the Federal Circuit, Alice’s patent would have been invalidated and 
other abstract idea patents could conceivably presume validity until 
directly challenged given that there was no majority opinion from 
the Federal Circuit to follow. However, because the Supreme 
Court issued an opinion, the patent system as a whole experienced 
an abrupt upheaval as Justice Thomas formally set out a test for 
adjudging abstract validity, taken from Mayo.169 In matters involv-
ing claims of abstract ideas, the Supreme Court directed that courts 
first determine whether the subject claim contains an abstract idea 
like a computer code or implementation.170 If the claimed matter 
does not contain any abstract ideas, it may be patentable on its 
 
163 See id. (internal citations omitted). 
164 See CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corps., 685 F.3d 1341, 1352–56 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
165 See CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corps., 717 F.3d 1269, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
166 See id. at 1333. 
167 See id. 
168 See Alice, 573 U.S. at 221. 
169 See id. at 217. 
170 See id. 
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own.171 If there is an abstract idea involved in the claim, the court 
directed that some “new and useful” application of the abstract 
idea must be present to qualify as patent eligible, such that there’s 
an “inventive concept.”172 
In delivering this landmark opinion, however, it is imperative 
to note that the Supreme Court decided that it “need not labor to 
delimit the precise contours of the ‘abstract ideas’ category [of pa-
tents],” effectively leaving the question wide open for the district 
courts and Federal Circuit to sort out.173 This task would hardly 
prove an easy one in the face of what was sure to be the mass in-
validations predicted by Judges O’Malley and Linn. 
In confronting this challenge, the Federal Circuit has side-
stepped answering the question of what exactly constitutes an  
abstract idea and instead now relies on a method of matching chal-
lenged claims against past claims already deemed to be abstract.174 
As patent practitioners have noted, this reliance on subjective 
matching and similarity compounds the uncertainty in the patent 
system and the situation is only exacerbated when neither the  
Supreme Court nor the Federal Circuit wish to fully articulate an 
answer to that critical question.175 At least one judge on the Federal 
Circuit has summarized the lack of a standard by noting that  “this 
court and the Supreme Court have [both] found it sufficient to 
compare claims at issue to those claims already found to be  
directed to an abstract idea in previous cases.”176 
F. Easing the Grounds for Fee Shifting—Octane (2014) 
Although shocks from Supreme Court patent jurisprudence 
since 2006 have generally proven unfavorable to the overall con-
sistency and strength of the U.S. patent system,177 occasionally 
those shocks have in fact resulted in stronger protection, albeit at 
the continued termination of long-standing precedent and further 
 
171 See id. 
172 See id. at 221–22. 
173 See Alice Corps. v. CLS Bank International, 573 U.S. 208, 221–22 (2014). 
174 See Quinn & Guttag, supra note 26. 
175 See id. 
176 Id.; see also Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
177 See supra Section II.a-e. 
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decline in consistency. The Supreme Court’s reversal of the Fed-
eral Circuit in Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, 
Inc.178 was one such case, one that in fact strengthened the U.S. 
courts’ ability to serve as an adequate venue for patent disputes. 
Here, the exact details to the patent in issue are less important than 
the alleged motivations behind the suit itself. 
Put briefly, ICON was a manufacturer of exercise equipment 
who also secured patents for new developments in the hardware.179 
One such patent held by ICON, for an adjustable elliptical system, 
was asserted against Octane, a fellow manufacturer of fitness 
equipment.180 The district court granted Octane’s motion for sum-
mary judgment after determining that there was no infringement 
but denied Octane’s subsequent motion for attorney’s fees.181 Alt-
hough 35 U.S.C. § 285 permits the award of reasonable attorney 
fees in “exceptional case[s],” Federal Circuit precedent required 
trial judges to find either “material inappropriate conduct” in the 
case or that the litigation had been brought “in subjective bad 
faith” and was thus “objectively baseless.”182 The district court 
found nothing in the litigation to satisfy either ground and dis-
missed Octane’s motion for attorney fees, a decision later affirmed 
by the Federal Circuit.183 
On review, the Supreme Court again reversed the Federal  
Circuit, 184  but this time in a way that would seemingly attract  
patent litigants rather than drive them off. Finding that the standard 
set forth in the Federal Circuit’s Brooks Furniture precedent was 
“unduly rigid,” the Supreme Court determined that the previous 
standard used for exceptionality “impermissibly encumber[ed] the 
statutory grant of discretion to district courts.”185 
 
178 572 U.S. 545 (2014). 
179 See id. at 551. 
180 See id. 
181 See id. at 552.  
182 Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 
2005). 
183 See Octane, 572 U.S. at 552–53. 
184 Id. at 558. 
185 Id. at 553. 
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This decision was important given prevailing American norms 
around litigation. Contrary to the English rule,186 the American 
rule of litigation states that each party pays their own costs and that  
attorney fees are only recoverable when specified by statute in  
certain actions.187 This decision thus brings American patent litiga-
tion slightly more in line with more attractive patent forums 
abroad. 188  In foreign jurisdictions that follow the English rule 
where the loser bears a significant percentage of litigation costs,189 
patent investment and litigation would inherently be far more  
attractive. This is because the rule would not only give patent trolls 
more pause before filing questionable actions given the potential  
financial liability, but it would also give practicing entities a more 
sound state of mind knowing that blatant infringement of one’s  
patent will now be less costly as the infringer will likely be the one 
paying the attorney’s fees. 
G. Easing the Grounds for Enhanced Damages—Halo, Stryker 
(2016) 
In the other exception to the general weakening of the U.S.  
patent system, Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc.,190 
along with its consolidated case of Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer Inc., 
addressed the question of whether the Federal Circuit was enforc-
ing too high a bar to acquire enhanced infringement damages. Halo 
 
186 The requirement that a losing litigant must pay the winner’s costs and attorney’s 
fees. English Rule, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th Ed. 2004). Cf. American Rule, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th Ed. 2004). 
187 See FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d). 
188 See generally Susie Middlemiss & Laura Balfour, Patent Litigation in the UK 
(England and Wales), PRACTICAL L. (July 1, 2018), https://uk.practicallaw.thomson
reuters.com/3-623-0277?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=
true&bhcp=1 [https://perma.cc/CY95-PY7P]; Andrew Liu, Patent Litigation in China, 
PRACTICAL L. (Apr. 1, 2018), https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/8-620-4407?
transitionType=Default&contextData=%28sc.Default%29 [https://perma.cc/DL9T-
LQST]; Wolfgang Kellenter & Benedikt Migdal, Patent Litigation in Germany, 
PRACTICAL L. (Apr. 1, 2018), https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/5-622-34
50?transitionType=Default&contextData=%28sc.Default%29 [https://perma.cc/VAF7-
X7A4]. 
189 See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The English Versus the American 
Rule on Attorney Fees: An Empirical Study of Public Company Contracts, 98 CORNELL 
L. REV. 327, 329 (2013). 
190 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016). 
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and Octane can thus be considered the patent cases in recent years 
to have actually strengthened the protection of a U.S. patent and to  
better dissuade potential infringers. 
In Halo, both Halo and Pulse were manufacturers of electronic 
components.191 Halo, which owned several patents for electronic 
package transformers, found Pulse producing similar products and 
offered to license its patents.192 One of Pulse’s engineers reviewed 
Halo’s patents and believed that the patents were invalid, where-
upon Pulse continued manufacturing the transformers that alle-
gedly infringed Halo’s patents.193 After failing to reach a license 
agreement, Halo filed suit against Pulse for infringement and  
secured a jury verdict finding both infringement and evidence to 
suggest that Pulse had infringed willfully.194  Halo’s motion for  
enhanced damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284, however, was denied.195 
In the parallel case’s facts, Stryker and Zimmer Surgical were 
both competitors in the orthopedic device market.196 When Zim-
mer allegedly infringed one of Stryker’s patents on a “pulsed lav-
age device,” Stryker brought suit against Zimmer for infringe-
ment. 197  The jury in Stryker similarly found infringement and  
evidence of willful infringement, but unlike in Halo, the district 
judge added enhanced damages for the willful infringement, noting 
that Zimmer’s business strategy seemed to expressly push legal 
concerns to the side in order to compete aggressively.198 
On appeal, both cases presented the same question to the Fed-
eral Circuit, whether their respective district judges had properly 
utilized Federal Circuit precedent to determine the appropriateness 
of enhanced damages.199 The standard, articulated in In re Seagate,  
requires patent owners to show “clear and convincing evidence 
that the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that 
 
191 See id. at 1930. 
192 See id.at 1930–31. 
193 See id. at 1931. 
194 See id. 
195 See id. 
196 See Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1931. 
197 Id. 
198 See id. 
199 See id. at 1931–32. 
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its actions constituted infringement of a valid patent” and then 
demonstrate that the infringement was “either known or so obvious 
that it should have been known to the accused infringer.” 200  
The Federal Circuit affirmed the denial of enhanced damages in 
Halo since Halo had reportedly failed to show Pulse’s objective 
recklessness; the Federal Circuit also reversed the grant of en-
hanced damages in Stryker, arguing that Zimmer had in fact 
demonstrated “reasonable defenses” at trial to remove the potential 
for enhanced damages.201 
On appeal to the Supreme Court to determine the proper stand-
ard for enhanced damages, the Supreme Court reversed the Federal 
Circuit and strengthened the patent system in the process.202 The 
Supreme Court found that the Federal Circuit had erred in  
adding additional stipulations to the statutory language concerning 
monies in patent matters, holding that the statute gave no indica-
tion that enhanced damages should be predicated on a strict basis 
as Seagate required; the statute in fact simply used the basic term 
“may” to indicate its discretion to the trial judge.203 
For the same reasons set forth above in Section II.g regarding 
Octane, this Supreme Court decision also upended Federal Circuit 
precedent in such a way that patent practitioners would question 
what fundamentals of patent law would change next, though this 
change at least strengthened the protections offered by the patent 
system at the same time. Halo made American patent litigation  
more palatable to innovators who may now be drawn to the juris-
diction’s newfound punitive measures for willful infringement as 
opposed to the laxer standards infringers could previously hide  
behind under Seagate. 
H. Overturning Forum Rules and the Long Trip from Texas to 
Delaware—TC Heartland (2017) 
TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC204 did 
not change much in the way of substantive patent law, but it did 
 
200 In re Seagate, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
201 Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1931. 
202 See id. 
203 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1952); see Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1931. 
204 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017). 
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upend approximately thirty years of patent litigation focused in the 
patent-plaintiff-friendly Eastern District of Texas.205 
Similar to Halo, the exact nature of the patents involved is not 
pertinent for the purposes of this Note. The important facts are lim-
ited to an infringement action by Kraft against TC Heartland in the 
District of Delaware over an alleged product patent.206 Despite TC 
Heartland being organized and headquartered in Indiana, Kraft at-
tempted to pull TC Heartland into court in Delaware on the 
longstanding premise that sale of allegedly infringing products in a 
remote district is sufficient as an “act of infringement” per 28 
U.S.C. § 1400(b) to justify a patent infringement action in a district 
to which the infringer otherwise has no ties to.207 Traditionally, this 
permissive “act of infringement” language has allowed patent 
owners to haul patent infringers to the Eastern District of Texas, a 
federal district with notably patent-plaintiff-friendly juries and 
judges, in order to acquire a favorable result and often in less time 
as well.208 
While TC Heartland did attempt to get the venue changed by 
moving for the case to be transferred to the Southern District of  
Indiana where they resided, the district court denied these argu-
ments and determined that the case could proceed in Delaware.209 
TC Heartland then petitioned the Federal Circuit for a writ of  
mandamus, but this was denied by the appellate court. The circuit 
court reasoned that the long-standing precedent, which had stood 
since the venue statute was last amended in 1988, would remain as 
is.210 TC Heartland subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court 
which granted certiorari.211 
 
205 See Matthew C. Hurley, Serge Subach & Robert J.L. Moore, Will 30 Years of 
Practice Be Overturned? Supreme Court Hears Oral Argument in TC Heartland v. Kraft 
Foods, MINTZ (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.mintz.com/insights-center/viewpoints/2231/ 
2017-03-will-30-years-practice-be-overturned-supreme-court-hears 
[https://perma.cc/2YVH-A2U4]. 
206 See TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1517 
(2017). 
207 See id. 
208 See Hurley, Subach & Moore, supra note 205. 
209 See TC Heartland, 137 S. Ct. at 1517. 
210 See id. at 1517–18. 
211 See id. at 1518. 
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On review, the Supreme Court vacated the ruling of the  
Federal Circuit. Relying on its prior analysis in Fourco Glass v. 
Transmirra Products regarding the assorted interpretations of  
“resides” and “residence,”212 the Supreme Court concluded that  
§ 1400(b)’s reference to “reside[nce]” refers to a business’s place  
of incorporation.213 
Taken as a whole, TC Heartland is likely the least impactful on 
the U.S. patent system of all the cases this Note discusses, at least  
in a direct manner. Whereas the other aforementioned post-2006  
Supreme Court cases like Alice and eBay changed the very  
fundamentals of patent practice, including patentability standards, 
critical components of litigation, and standards of proof among 
others, TC Heartland merely narrowed where patent disputes could 
be filed. 
Patent practitioners had undoubtedly become accustomed to 
having to fly down to Texas and become acquainted with the local 
rules, but the case’s ultimate impact on the system as a whole will 
likely be how much the altered venue filings back up the assorted 
districts’ dockets. Whereas the Eastern District of Texas was origi-
nally the biggest patent dispute venue, Delaware, a smaller district 
with fewer judges, is quickly drawing more patent filings; this is 
likely because it is the state of incorporation for most of the coun-
try’s largest publicly-traded corporations. 214  Should Delaware’s 
docket quickly become swamped by the influx of filings beyond 
what its current judges can handle, the average patent litigation 
timeframe will get even longer, as will the average amount of time 
needed to dispose of a relatively ordinary patent case.215 Conse-
quently, while TC Heartland does not substantively affect the fun-
damentals of patent law, it will very likely procedurally affect the 
 
212 353 U.S. 222 (1957). 
213 TC Heartland, 137 S. Ct. at 1520. 
214 See Ryan Davis, Delaware Outstrips Texas as Top Patent Hotspot of 2018, LAW360 
(Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1121979/delaware-outstrips-texas-as-
top-patent-hotspot-of-2018 [https://perma.cc/BXY5-RS8J]. 
215 See Joe Mullin, Many Patent-Holders Stop Looking to East Texas Following 
Supreme Court Ruling, ARSTECHNICA (Oct. 12, 2017), https://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2017/10/patent-cases-in-east-texas-plunge-more-than-60-percent/ 
[https://perma.cc/9AKL-D83F] (raising concerns about Delaware’s smaller number of 
active judges and less patent experience relative to the judges of East Texas). 
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general patent system over time by shifting patent infringement  
filings away from the eight district judges active in the Eastern  
District of Texas and diverting many of those filings to the four  
active district judges in Delaware.216 
I. Signs of Extrajudicial Expansion in Patent Jurisdiction—
WesternGeco (2018) 
The final case in the recent trend of reversals is WesternGeco 
LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp.,217 a curious instance of the Su-
preme Court seemingly testing the waters of extraterritorial juris-
diction. In this instance, WesternGeco owned several patents cov-
ering “lateral-steering technology” components utilized in ocean 
surveying technology. 218  Not one to license or sell its patents, 
WesternGeco was for a while the only oceanic surveyor using such 
lateral-steering technology and profited via surveys done for oil 
companies. Eventually, however, WesternGeco realized that ION 
had begun selling a comparable system.219 WesternGeco discov-
ered that ION actually had the components needed to construct a 
similar system manufactured in the United States, but then shipped 
those parts abroad for final assembly into a working product that 
mirrored WesternGeco’s patent system.220 Upon filing suit against 
ION, WesternGeco prevailed when a jury found evidence of  
infringement and awarded over $100 million in royalties and  
lost profits.221 
ION moved to have the award of lost profits set aside as those 
profits had been made outside of U.S. jurisdiction, but the motion 
was denied. 222  ION thus appealed to the Federal Circuit and  
acquired its requested relief when the appellate court set aside the 
original award of lost damages after finding that the general in-
 
216 See Chronological History of Authorized Judgeships—District Courts, U.S. CTS., 
https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/authorized-judgeships/chronological-
history-authorized-judgeships-district-courts [https://perma.cc/X8XT-Q74X]. 
217 138 S. Ct. 2129 (2018). 
218 See id. at 2135–36. 
219 See id. 
220 See id. 
221 See id. 
222 See id. 
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fringement statute does not permit recovery of foreign profit.223 
This decision was appealed to the Supreme Court where it was  
vacated and remanded the case back to the Federal Circuit in 2016 
to be reconsidered in light of the recent Halo decision, though  
the Federal Circuit reentered judgment denying the award of  
foreign profits.224 
Upon returning back to the Supreme Court after another ap-
peal, the Justices decided that lost profits could in fact be recov-
ered based on a two-step inquiry into extraterritorial judgments 
from another recent case, RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Commu-
nity. 225  In determining this question, the Court first considered 
whether an existing presumption against extraterritoriality may be 
rebutted and, if so, directed that the court must determine whether 
the case at hand involves a domestic application of the subject 
statute.226  The majority found that the present case did in fact  
involve a domestic application and so foreign profits could accord-
ingly be awarded.227 
The two-justice dissent, seemingly rare in the face of the  
numerous 9–0 or 8–0 decisions in recent Supreme Court patent 
cases, actually made the same argument that many IP practitioners 
were themselves making 228 : permitting recovery of lost profits 
from domestic IP rights could open a Pandora’s Box wherein other 
countries could mirror said practice.229 As Justice Gorsuch so elo-
quently stated: “[T]he tables easily could be turned. If our courts 
award compensation to U.S. patent owners for foreign uses where 
 
223 See WesternGeco, 138 S.Ct. at 2135–36. 
224 See id. 
225 See id. at 2136 (citing RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S.Ct. 2090, 2101 
(2016)). 
226 See id. 
227 See id. at 2139. 
228 See generally Brief for Intellectual Property Law Scholars as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Neither Party, WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129 
(2018) (No. 16-1011); Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation and R Street Institute as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 
S. Ct. 2129 (2018) (No. 16-1011); Brief for Fairchild Semiconductor International, Inc., 
the Internet Association, SAS Institute Inc., Symmetry, LLC, and Xilinx, Inc. as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Respondent, WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 
2129 (2018) (No. 16-1011). 
229 See WesternGeco, 138 S. Ct. at 2143–44 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
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our patents don’t run, what happens when foreign courts return the 
favor?”230 His further point that Congress would likely never stand 
for foreign jurisdictions awarding damages for foreign patent in-
fringements in the United States was well made but regrettably was 
not in the majority opinion. Thus, the high court threw the U.S.  
patent system yet another curve ball with which to contend. 
III. AN (UN)PATENTED FIX 
With a brief patent background now in mind, as well as a 
summation of the recent string of Supreme Court reversals, the 
question presented is what exactly can be done to reverse the ap-
parent degradation of the U.S. patent system. Similar to the prob-
lem itself, the most straightforward solution is hardly new: get 
Congress to amend the patent system.231 
The last significant amendment to the U.S. patent system came 
in 2011 when President Barrack Obama signed into law the 
Leahy–Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”).232 The AIA enacted a 
number of important changes to the existing system, such as shift-
ing from a first-to-invent system to first-to-file, 233  creating the  
Patent Trial and Appeal Board as a separate venue to dispute  
patent validity,234 and fine-tuning a number of smaller application 
requirements.235 Notably absent from the AIA, however, was any 
guidance or change to the assorted areas of patent law the Supreme 
Court had ruled on in the five years since eBay. Despite the signif-
 
230 Id. at 2143. 
231 See Ken Blackwell, Time to Reverse America’s Innovative Decline, AM. THINKER 
(Apr. 14, 2018), https://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2018/04/time_to_reverse_
americas_innovation_decline.html [https://perma.cc/M4NW-S26H]; see also Mark 
Marrello, Urge the Drafters of the New Section 101 to Support Inventor-Friendly Reform, 
IP WATCHDOG (May 13, 2019), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/05/13/urge-drafters-
new-section-101-support-inventor-friendly-reform/id=109206/ [https://perma.cc/W3SA-
H845]; Quinn, supra note 7. 
232 AIA, supra note 3. 
233 Whereas the United States previously granted patents for inventions to the 
individual or entity that first invented a new concept, the AIA changed the system such 
that the first individual or entity to file for said new concept would be the one entitled to 
the patent. See id. § 3. 
234 See id. § 7. 
235 See generally AIA, supra note 3. 
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icant changes to the patent system that came in 2006 with eBay and 
in 2008 with KSR, there was no legislative change to injunctive 
relief or obviousness standards within the AIA. The larger, more 
impactful ramifications of the Supreme Court’s patent decisions 
since 2006 had apparently been ignored by Congress upon enact-
ment of the AIA. 
Since then, bipartisan members of Congress, both in the House 
and in the Senate, introduced the Support Technology and Re-
search for Our Nation’s Growth and Economic Resilience Patents 
Act of 2018, or STRONGER Patents Act of 2018.236 However, this  
pending bill is not sufficient, at least as currently written, to  
adequately repair the U.S. patent system in light of the numerous 
judicial changes that it has endured over the last two decades. 
To the proposed bill’s credit, it does expressly direct judges to 
grant injunctive relief upon finding patent validity and infringe-
ment.237 However, it fails to address the numerous other issues  
arising from the recent Supreme Court cases, all of which sparked 
sufficient feedback that Congress would be shirking its responsibil-
ities were it to leave those issues unmentioned. Despite the slew of 
eligibility cases like Alice, Myriad, and Mayo, the bill offers little 
to no clarification for patent applicants and owners.238 The bill 
similarly fails to offer any response to TC Heartland and the  
migration of patent cases from the East Texas to Delaware federal 
court districts despite the clear difference in judicial resources to 
efficiently process and resolve those disputes.239 
By failing to comprehensively and systematically address all  
of the issues raised in the Supreme Court patent cases since 2006, 
Congress is again slapping a small bandage on a wound that re-
quires a more surgical approach. This dilemma was all the more 
frustrated by the changes of the 2011 AIA which resulted in addi-
tional patent issues to add atop those raised by the Supreme Court 
 
236 See Blackwell, supra note 231; STRONGER Patents Act of 2018, H.R. 5340, 115th 
Cong. (2018). 
237 See STRONGER Patents Act of 2018, H.R. 5340, 115th Cong. § 106 (2018). 
238 See generally id. (no changes with regard to § 101 eligibility). 
239 See generally id. (no changes with regard to appropriate venue to file patent 
actions). 
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decisions.240 Just as Congress in 2011 failed to include an adequate 
solution to at least partly remedy the abrupt about-face that eBay 
represented five years prior, so too does the STRONGER Patents 
Act fail to address some of the more pressing issues to arise from 
Supreme Court decisions this past decade.241 
This is not to say that the STRONGER Patents Act is a bad 
idea. The fact that the bill is on the minds of at least some mem-
bers of Congress is a sign of progress as the bill can be amended to 
serve as a vehicle for the changes needed to firmly set the U.S.  
patent system on a better track. While in the meantime Director 
Iancu has been commendably attempting to single-handedly stop 
the patent system’s bleeding with USPTO directives and guidance 
letters, comprehensive legislative reform is what would best cor-
rect the overall system’s state of affairs.242 
A. Specific, Targeted Legislation Written Via Consensus 
To properly remedy the patent system via legislation, congres-
sional members should supplement any information contained in 
lobbying group proposals with actual input from constituents  
already familiar with the system. By beginning the fact-finding at 
this level, lawmakers would ensure that the interests of all con-
cerned districts are represented in some manner to better reflect the 
different views that said districts hold depending on their respec-
tive industry representation. 
 
240 See Steve Brachmann, STRONGER Patents Act Introduced in House, Seeks to 
Strengthen a Crippled Patent System, IP WATCHDOG (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.ip
watchdog.com/2018/03/26/stronger-patents-act-house/id=95188/ 
[https://perma.cc/H9NM-EEVG] (referring to the myriad of concerns arising from the 
post-grant review proceedings conducted at the AIA-created Patent Trial and Appeal 
Board, namely parallel challenges in district courts, the suppressive effect such 
proceedings have on patent values and company stock, and the ability for multiple 
challenges to be filed in what could be considered a harassing manner). 
241 See generally STRONGER Patents Act of 2018, H.R. 5340, 115th Cong. (2018) 
(failing to, for example, mention any definition of an “abstract idea” despite it being the 
subject of three controversial Supreme Court decisions). 
242 See generally Statement Delivered Before the United States House Subcommittee on 
Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet Committee on the Judiciary, 116th 
Congress (2019) (Statement of Director Iancu), https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-
updates/statement-director-iancu-united-states-house-subcommittee-courts-intellectual 
[https://perma.cc/APJ9-L22F]; Korenchan, supra note 27; Quinn, Iancu, supra note 81. 
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As an example, by balancing the interests of tech-heavy  
districts wary of nebulous eligibility standards following Alice with 
the interests of districts with many pro-patent pharmaceutical com-
panies, a more widely appealing consensus could be derived. Fail-
ure to do so would likely serve as a repeat of the AIA: a collection 
of good ideas with the best of intentions, but utterly infuriating in 
other aspects for failing to address perceived shortcomings. This is 
not to say Congress should give their patent-practicing constituents 
carte blanche to write the bill as they please, but should instead  
take into account the input of those already intimately familiar with 
the system. 
Still, it would be naïve to assume that everyone interested in 
how patents are reformed could agree on a singular version of a 
bill, particularly given how vocal members of the prominent tech 
industry have been in deriding the Federal Circuit as a whole for 
what they believe are overly protective rulings. 243  Regardless, 
while Congress should generally go about its bill crafting process 
as usual by allowing individuals and interest groups to send in their 
submissions, thoughts, and drafts, it is paramount that the resultant 
bill at least addresses each of the concerns raised by practitioners 
in the wake of so many Supreme Court patent decisions that have 
routinely upset patent norms.244 
A cursory glance of the two dozen or so patent cases from the 
Supreme Court since eBay in 2006 makes it eminently clear that 
there are disputes in the patent system that everyone involved 
would agree require clarification, whether it be the constant buzz 
of practitioners publishing general grievances online245 or the far 
more noteworthy instances where the judicial figures handling 
 
243 See generally Timothy Lee, Google Asks Supreme Court to Overrule Disastrous 
Ruling on API Copyright, ARSTECHNICA (Jan. 1, 2019), https://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2019/01/google-asks-supreme-court-to-overrule-disastrous-ruling-on-api-
copyrights/ [https://perma.cc/F9CT-68ED] (noting how non-patent practitioners 
interested primarily in technology and copyright law still have an opinion of the Federal 
Circuit and would therefore likely be interested in how the appellate court’s jurisprudence 
is tweaked). 
244 See supra Section II. 
245 See sources cited supra note 21. 
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such disputes blatantly call for congressional action in their opin-
ions.246 
It therefore becomes imperative to reform the patent system 
such that it complies with the collaborative nature of Congress 
while at the same time addressing all of the legitimate concerns 
that have arisen in the last decade or so.247 This means that actual 
consideration must be given to the issues raised in the above-
described cases, including what exactly constitutes an abstract 
idea,248 whether permanent injunctive relief in patent infringement 
actions really must be beholden to the traditional four-factor test,249 
how exactly lost foreign profits should be approached, 250  and 
whether venue selection should be limited if the dockets of certain 
district courts become saturated and backed-up.251 
As a relatively objective matter, the question of abstract ideas 
really must be addressed before these other issues. Put most suc-
 
246 See Ryan Davis, Fed. Circ. Judges’ Plea to Reps Shows Patent-Eligibility Angst, 
LAW360 (June 4, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1049274 [https://perma.cc/
HYU9-Z2Q2]; see also Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 890 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (denying 
petition for en banc hearing). In her concurrence in Berkheimer, Judge Lourie, joined by 
Judge Newman, states that “the law needs clarification by higher authority, perhaps by 
Congress, to work its way out of what so many in the innovation field consider 
are [Section] 101 problems.” 890 F.3d at 1375 (Lourie, J., concurring). She adds that 
“[i]ndividual cases, whether heard by this court or the Supreme Court, are imperfect 
vehicles for enunciating broad principles because they are limited to the facts 
presented. Section 101 issues certainly require attention beyond the power of this court.” 
Id. 
247 This chance for reform also represents a critical opportunity for a divided Congress 
to agree on a fairly non-divisive matter. Contrary to some of the more attention-grabbing 
matters that split public opinion like defense spending, entitlement spending, firearm 
regulation, and certain civil rights, IP protection is a matter that sees comparatively little 
opposition and is therefore ripe for minimally opposed reform. See generally 115 P.L. 
264, 132 Stat. 3676, 2018 Enacted H.R. 1551, 115 Enacted H.R. 1551, 115 P.L. 264, 132 
Stat. 3676, 2018 Enacted H.R. 1551, 115 Enacted H.R. 1551 (representing one of the few 
substantive legislative changes, an update to IP rights, to pass Congress in a time of 
severe division); Elliot Fink, Musical Copyrights as a Rare-Instance[sic] of 
Bipartisanship: The House Passes H.R. 1551 The Music Modernization Act, FORDHAM 
IPLJ BLOG (Oct. 1, 2018), http://www.fordhamiplj.org/2018/10/01/musical-copyrights-
as-a-rare-instance-of-bipartisanship-the-house-should-pass-h-r-1551-the-music-
modernization-act/ [https://perma.cc/SQW4-V9ZQ]. 
248 See supra Section II.e. 
249 See supra Section II.a. 
250 See supra Section II.i. 
251 See supra Section II.h. 
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cinctly by retired Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit Randall Rader, 
“you have cases like eBay . . . Alice, Mayo, and Myriad, all of 
which have severely handicapped the innovative capacity of the 
United States.”252 Whereas nations like China are now benefiting 
from America’s seeming aversion to software patents and other 
ideas that tangentially touch the abstract,253 the U.S. patent system 
can recapture some of the lost innovation and restore some cer-
tainty by simply clarifying what exactly is patentable through a 
revision of § 101. Innovation is thought to be lessened and the val-
ue of patents diminished when certainty in the promised rights 
falls,254 so the inverse can and should be expected. So long as  
patents are not threatened with invalidation because the subject 
matter exists in a grey area as a result of case law, innovation can 
be expected to increase, contrary to the current decline. It simply 
starts with amending § 101 to clarify the questions left by Mayo, 
Myriad, and Alice, and, by extension, answering the pleas of count-
less practitioners and even a few judges. 
With regard to the matter of eBay, it is difficult to get behind 
the old method of permanent injunctive relief absent exceptional 
circumstances given the proliferation of patent trolls who attempt 
to extort license agreements like in the titular case.255 However, to 
keep the four-factor test that so grossly weighs against the most 
fundamental right inherent to patents is doubly impermissible. One 
possible way around the dilemma would be to include a provision 
to update 35 U.S.C. § 273—Defense to infringement based on  
prior commercial use. The eBay decision came out in 2006 based 
on a patent application that was filed in 1995, the same year that 
eBay began operating, and was only granted in 1998. The original 
action in district court was resolved in 2002, a full four years after 
the patent was granted and five years after eBay had started operat-
ing. The current statute, added in 1999, permits a prior use defense 
if said commercial use occurred at least one year prior to the appli-
cation’s filing date, which could have covered eBay at the time but 
is not clear given the uncertainty as to exactly when their online 
 
252 See Quinn, Iancu, supra note 81. 
253 See Quinn & Guttag, supra note 26. 
254 See generally sources cited supra note 52. 
255 See supra Section II.A.  
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auction website as currently recognized began to operate. To  
that end, a return to the previous rule of liberally granted perma-
nent injunctions could be effectively balanced against troll abuse 
by amending § 273 to permit a greater grace period of prior  
use protection. 
The other two express problems mentioned are slightly easier 
to address. Given that the greatest detriment to the patent system 
from TC Heartland is likely to be a crowding of certain district 
courts, a simple amendment to authorize additional judges should 
more than suffice. As it stands, the District of Delaware has only 
four active judges whereas the old patent forum of choice, the 
Eastern District of Texas, has eight. A review of the assorted dis-
tricts, their dockets, and case-per-judge metrics would quickly 
yield the necessary information to add additional seats for active 
judges, particularly those in districts experiencing rises in patent 
filings. As for WesternGeco and its ideas on extraterritorial juris-
diction, a clear, express statement that U.S. patents control com-
merce within the United States should be included in the new leg-
islation, just enough to adequately state Congress’ position and 
dissuade other nations from implementing policies permitting simi-
lar lost profit actions against American entities. 
B. Further Rationalization and Explanation from the Supreme 
Court in Reversals 
Congressional action is undoubtedly the most effective and  
plausible solution which the patent community can pursue, particu-
larly because its participants, the elected politicians, are actually  
beholden to the will of the people through elections. However, 
should Congress prove unwilling or unable to pass adequate  
reform, intermediary relief with regard to the recent uncertainties 
like Alice could at least be sought from the Supreme Court. Should 
an appropriate case arise, and should the high court be adequately 
swayed by the pleas for clarity by practitioners, frustrated congres-
sional members, or both, the Supreme Court could use such a case 
as a vehicle to deliver more concrete grounds for the patent system 
to operate on, as well as a resolution to the underlying case. 
There is of course no way in which to actively implement said 
alternative since the Justices are not beholden to anyone in the 
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same way that Congress is, but making such a plea is not implausi-
ble. Generally, the high court does seem reluctant to take such  
cases where a congressional solution is possible and arguably the 
better solution. However, if Congress remains as gridlocked as it is 
today, it is conceivable that a collective plea from both practi-
tioners and lower court opinions to the Supreme Court to clear up 
ambiguity in the patent law jurisprudence may yield additional  
reviews and ultimately prove beneficial since any concrete input 
from the high court would prove useful. The requested clearer lan-
guage in a subsequent patent case would either elucidate past  
ambiguities from previous decisions, such as abstract inventions in 
Alice, or further muddy the jurisprudence and thus put additional 
pressure on Congress to cooperate and pass more comprehensive 
reform. 
The Supreme Court using a new patent case to resolve an am-
biguity stemming from a past case would truly be beneficial, as it 
would mean one fewer ambiguity for practitioners to contend with. 
Alternatively, should the Supreme Court use a new patent case to 
either worsen an existing ambiguity or disturb yet another facet of 
patent law to further disturb the U.S. patent system, it would un-
doubtedly be inconvenient to practitioners, but also would at least 
strengthen the case for drastic, urgent patent reform to Congress. 
The latter course of action would effectively be the equivalent of 
throwing gasoline on a fire in order to attract a disinterested per-
son’s attention. This escalation of course appears harmful in the 
short run, but should further delay occur while Congress conti-
nually proves uncooperative and as the patent system falls deeper 
into disarray, then the legal community’s options may be so lim-
ited that such a course of action might seem advisable. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the Federal Circuit did not quite push back against 
the Supreme Court’s rulings in eBay or KSR, they did offer up  
some resistance in 2012–2013 during the remands of Myriad and 
Mayo. Ever since, there has been a subtle friction between the  
nation’s highest court and its patent specialist appellate court. To 
summarize said friction and subsequent court decisions as simply 
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resulting in uncertainty in the jurisprudence does not quite do the 
situation justice. 
Aside from the general uncertainty about when patent practice 
will again abruptly change, patents as property rights in the United 
States have lost a significant amount of the bite that they once had 
and were inherently meant to possess. In other words, though U.S.  
patents are still potent against infringers and valuable as property 
rights, they are arguably less powerful and less valuable, relatively 
speaking, because of this uncertainty in the system. The validity of 
at least tens of thousands of patents remain in question given nebu-
lous standards as to patent eligibility. The continued abrupt chang-
es to the patent system have led to some of the judges involved in 
the friction to openly ask America’s elected officials to do their 
jobs and implement reform legislation. This does not even account 
for whatever incentives are being offered abroad to attract innova-
tion away from America. Thus, America’s patent system is long 
due for an extensive overhaul. 
Admittedly, patent law is by no means the most exciting, 
newsworthy subject. This is certainly true in a world where there 
are striking news stories meant to capture everyone’s attention  
every few minutes. It also does not help that so few people actively 
interact with the patent system on a regular or even semi-regular 
basis. None of that, though, diminishes the importance of the  
patent system as a whole, nor does it detract from the fact it  
requires reform soon, before additional ambiguity and uncertainty 
arise from further disagreements between the Federal Circuit and 
Supreme Court. Should no remedial measures be taken, one of the 
most important foundational pieces of America’s commerce will 
likely continue to degrade in such a way that it will eventually  
impact the average American once commercial entities adjust their 
strategic operations to account for these relatively weaker IP  
protections. 
